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Short-run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries. How do they affect long-run
adoption? We present a model of technology adoption in which people learn about a technology's
effectiveness by using it (or observing others using it) for some time, but people quit using it too early
if they face higher-than-expected usage costs (e.g., side effects). The extent to which one-off subsidies
increase experimentation, and thereby affect learning and long-run adoption, then depends on people's
priors on these usage costs. One-off subsidies can also affect long-run adoption through reference-dependence:
People might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later.
We estimate these effects in a two-stage randomized field experiment in Kenya. We find that, for a
new technology with a lower usage cost than the technology it replaces, short-run subsidies increase
long-run adoption through experience and social learning effects. We find no evidence that people





Los Angeles, CA 90095
and NBER
pdupas@econ.ucla.edu1 Introduction
Between nine and ten million children under age ￿ve die every year, most of them in developing
countries.1 It is estimated that nearly two thirds of these deaths could be averted using existing
preventative technologies, such as vaccines, insecticide-treated materials, vitamin supplementa-
tion, or point-of-use chlorination of drinking water.2 An important question yet to be answered
is how to increase adoption of these technologies.
A commonly proposed way to increase adoption in the short run is to distribute those
essential health products for free or at highly subsidized prices (WHO, 2007; Sachs, 2005).
There are two main reasons to do so. First, given the infectious nature of the diseases they
prevent, most of these products generate positive health externalities, and private investment
in them would be socially suboptimal without a subsidy. Second, when the majority of the
population is poor and credit-constrained, subsidies might be necessary to ensure widespread
access (Cohen and Dupas, 2010).
For some products, such as vaccines, one-time adoption is su¢ cient to generate important
health impacts. One-time subsidies are well-suited for such technologies. But for other products,
such as anti-malarial bednets, water treatment kits, or condoms, repeated adoption over time
is required to generate the hoped-for health impacts. A key question and ongoing debate is
whether one-time subsidies for such technologies increase or dampen private investments in
them in the long run.
Free or highly subsidized distribution of a product in the short run may increase demand in
the long run if the product is an experience good. Bene￿ciaries of a free or highly subsidized
sample will be more willing to pay for a replacement after experiencing the bene￿ts and learning
the true value of the product if they previously had underestimated these bene￿ts. This learning
might trickle down to others in the community (those ineligible for the subsidy) and increase the
overall willingness to pay in the population as knowledge of the true value of the product di⁄uses.
Furthermore, if short-run adoption of the product leads to positive health and productivity
e⁄ects, bene￿ciaries of a subsidized sample might have more cash-on-hand to invest in sustained
adoption.
1Black et al, 2003.
2Jones et al., 2003.
1These positive e⁄ects hinge upon people￿ s making use of a product or technology that they
receive for free or at a highly subsidized price. This might not be the case, however. Households
that are not willing to pay a high monetary price for a product might also be unwilling to pay
the non-monetary costs associated with using the product on a daily basis (Chassang, Padro i
Miquel and Snowberg, 2009; Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro, forthcoming).
Furthermore, consumers could take previously encountered prices as reference points, or
anchors, which would a⁄ect their subsequent reservation price (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). Such
e⁄ects, known in psychology as ￿background contrast e⁄ects￿and ￿rst identi￿ed experimentally
by Simonson and Tversky (1992), have recently been observed outside the lab by Simonsohn
and Loewenstein (2006). Under such reference-dependent preferences, subsidies could generate
an ￿entitlement e⁄ect￿ : those who receive a subsidy for a health product may anchor around
the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay a higher price for the product once the subsidy
ends or is reduced.
The view that these negative e⁄ects might dominate the standard positive learning e⁄ects is
quite prevalent among development practitioners. As the Boston Globe summarized: ￿The Holy
Grail of international development has long been sustainability ￿[...] for several decades it￿ s
been the conventional wisdom that unless people spend money on something they will be unlikely
to value it ￿or use it. Give things away and they will be taken for granted, it￿ s thought.￿ 3 For
example, the non-pro￿t organization One Acre Fund, working with rural households in East
Africa, lists as its core value: ￿We don￿ t give handouts - we empower permanent life change.
Lasting change must rely on the poor themselves.￿ 4 There is, however, no rigorous evidence to
date as to what short-run subsidies do to long-run adoption of new technologies.
This paper aims to inform this debate in two steps. First, we provide a model for under-
standing the role of prices in the adoption of technologies for which adoption requires not only
acquisition, but also repeated usage of the technology once acquired. We generate predictions
as to the circumstances and technology characteristics under which short-run subsidies will
increase the long run level of adoption. Second, we test the predictions of the model through a
￿eld experiment for one speci￿c technology (long-lasting antimalarial bednets) in one speci￿c
3Christopher Shea, ￿A Hand Out, not a Hand Up￿ , November 2007. Article retrived on 12/13/2009 at
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/11/11/a_handout_not_a_hand_up/
4Retrieved on March 2, 2009 at this link: http://www.oneacrefund.org/how_it_works/core_values
2set of circumstances.
The key feature of our model is that households are uncertain about two elements of a
newly introduced health technology or health product: the e⁄ectiveness of the product, and its
non-monetary cost of usage (for example, how ￿hot￿it is to sleep under a bednet, or how bad
a deworming pill tastes). People immediately learn the cost of usage upon buying the product,
say by using the product for one day. In contrast, learning about the e⁄ectiveness takes some
time: people who use the product receive (publicly observable) signals about its e⁄ectiveness,
but these signals are imprecise, in particular in environments where individual-speci￿c health
shocks are common. In this context, we show that subsidies may have no e⁄ect on the adoption
of the product if people initially underestimate its non-monetary usage cost. This is because
subsidies a⁄ect the purchase decision of households who have a low prior about the product￿ s
e⁄ectiveness. These households will likely not use the product once they learn its true usage
cost. In this context, higher subsidies may not generate additional signals about the product￿ s
e⁄ectiveness and therefore may not a⁄ect the dynamic adoption process. In contrast, subsidies
will increase the level of experimentation and thus learning about the new product if people
initially overestimate the non-monetary usage cost. This, in turn, will speed up the di⁄usion
process and increase long-run adoption, unless people exhibit reference-dependent preferences
and anchor around subsidized prices.
To test these predictions, we conducted a ￿eld experiment in Kenya with a new technol-
ogy whose non-monetary usage cost was likely overestimated by households at baseline. The
technology we introduced is the Olyset long-lasting insecticide-treated bed net (LLIN), a recent
innovation in malaria control. The Olyset LLIN is signi￿cantly more comfortable to sleep un-
der than traditional bednets, and also more e⁄ective in the long run. The experiment involved
1,120 households in Kenya and included two phases. In Phase 1, subsidy levels for Olyset LLINs
were randomly assigned across households within six villages. Households had three months
to acquire the LLIN at the subsidized price they had been assigned to. Prices varied from $0
to $3.80, which is about twice the average daily wage for casual agricultural work in the study
area. In Phase 2, a year later, all households in four villages were given a second opportunity
to acquire an Olyset LLIN, but this time everyone faced the same price ($2.30). Phase 2 was
unannounced, therefore at the time individuals made their purchasing decision in Phase 1, they
were not aware that they would receive a second chance to acquire the product a year later.
3The LLIN was not available outside of the experiment, but traditional nets were available on
the market at the retail price of $1.50.
This experimental design allows us to test multiple predictions about the e⁄ects of temporary
subsidies on demand, both over time and across individuals.
We ￿rst test whether subsidies increased the level of experimentation. We ￿nd very strong
evidence for this prediction, consistent with the fact that the new technology introduced was
less costly to use than households anticipated. We then test whether this higher level of exper-
imentation led to positive or negative updating about the private returns to LLIN use. To this
end, we examine how full or very large subsidies for an LLIN in Phase 1 a⁄ect willingness to
pay for an LLIN in Phase 2. We ￿nd that gaining access to a free or highly subsidized LLIN in
the ￿rst year increases households￿reported as well as observed willingness to pay for an LLIN
a year later. This suggests the presence of a learning e⁄ect which dominates any potential
anchoring e⁄ect. We then test speci￿cally for the presence of anchoring. We ￿nd some evidence
of anchoring at higher prices, but no anchoring around zero or very low prices. Overall, our
evidence suggests important learning-by-doing e⁄ects among subsidy receipients.
We then turn to studying the social e⁄ects of subsidies. To avoid the classic re￿ ection
problem in the estimation of social e⁄ects (Manski, 1993), we exploit the exogenous variation
in the density of households who received a free or highly subsidized LLIN in Phase 1 as a
source of exogenous variation in exposure to signals about the returns to using the product.
We ￿nd that households facing a positive price in Phase 1 were more likely to purchase the
LLIN when the density of households around them who received a free or highly subsidized
LLIN was greater, suggesting social learning e⁄ects.
Overall, our results suggest that, consistent with the model prediction given the character-
istics of the technology studied, the total e⁄ect of short-run subsidies on long-run adoption of
LLINs is positive. Previously encountered prices matter, but more so through their e⁄ect on
available knowledge about the product than through entitlement e⁄ects.
The model helps reconcile our ￿ndings with those of two previous studies, Ashraf, Berry
and Shapiro (forthcoming) and Kremer and Miguel (2007), which both found results somewhat
opposite to ours. Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro ￿nd that subsidies for a water chlorination product
in urban Zambia increased the rate of purchase but did not increase the overall rate of exper-
imentation with the product. Their result is consistent with the case of our model in which
4people underestimate the cost of using chlorine at the time they make the decision to purchase
it (e.g., they underestimate the chlorinated taste of the water). In that case, those induced to
purchase the product by a subsidy are not motivated to use it once they learn its true usage
cost.
Kremer and Miguel (2007) use a randomized evaluation of a school-based deworming pro-
gram in Kenya to estimate the role of peer e⁄ects in health technology adoption. They ￿nd
that households were less likely to invest in deworming if they had a higher number of social
contacts who bene￿tted from free deworming in the past. Their negative e⁄ect is also con-
sistent with our model. Deworming pills generate important negative side e⁄ects, making the
non-monetary cost of deworming relatively high. Households in the Kremer and Miguel study
likely underestimated these costs initially. Subsidies for deworming enabled households to learn
the true usage cost of deworming and revise their beliefs about the private returns to using the
drug downwards, thus leading to lower long-run adoption.
Our ￿ndings also help shed light on the Kremer and Miguel (2007) result that parents
in Kenya who were exposed to free deworming treatment for their children for a year were
extremely unwilling to pay for deworming once it stopped being free. Their experimental
design did not allow a test of whether this drop was due to ￿entitlement￿e⁄ects or to low
perceived private returns of deworming. Our results, based on data from the same area of
Kenya, suggest that entitlement e⁄ects likely played a negligible role in the demand drop that
they observed following the price increase.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the role of learning-by-doing and social
learning in technology adoption in poor countries. The evidence so far, mostly non-experimental
and mostly focused on agricultural technologies, is rather mixed and suggests that the role of
social learning is likely to vary greatly with the context and the product considered.5 Our paper
5Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Besley and Case (1997) ￿nd that a farmer￿ s ability to reap pro￿ts from
a new technology increases with not only her own but also her neighbors￿experience with the new technology,
but Munshi (2004) ￿nds that social learning requires a certain degree of homogeneity among farmers, and
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) ￿nd some evidence of strategic delay in adoption of new products. Conley and
Udry (forthcoming) present evidence that social learning is important in the di⁄usion of knowledge regarding
pineapple cultivation in Ghana, while the randomized experiment of Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson (2009) ￿nds
no social learning in fertilizer use in Western Kenya. There are few empirical studies of social learning outside
agriculture. Behrman et al. (2001) study social networks of young women in rural Kenya and ￿nd evidence of S-
shaped di⁄usion of attitudes and behaviors with respect to contraception and AIDS. Munshi and Myaux (2006)
provide suggestive evidence from India that a woman￿ s contraception decision responds strongly to changes in
contraceptive prevalence in her own religious group within the village but not to changes outside her religious
5also contributes to the empirical ￿psychology and economics￿ literature, testing behavioral
economics in the ￿eld (see DellaVigna, 2009, for a review), and complements earlier papers
that have estimated, in rich countries, how the willingness to pay for a product can be a⁄ected
by anchors (Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003), previously encountered prices (Simonsohn
and Loewenstein, 2006; Mazar, Koszegi and Ariely, 2009), or the range of options available
(McFadden, 1999; He⁄etz and Shayo, 2009). Finally, our paper makes a contribution to the
literature on experimentation and experience goods pricing (Bergemann and Valimaki, 2000,
2006).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model of technology adoption
in the presence of ex-ante uncertainty about both the e⁄ectiveness of the technology and its
usage cost. Section 3 presents some background information on malaria and the preventative
technology studied in the application, and then describes the experimental design. Section 4
presents the results on the direct e⁄ect of subsidies, and Section 5 presents the results on their
indirect e⁄ects via social learning. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a general framework for understanding the adoption of a new preventative
health technology. The goal is to clarify the potential channels through which a one-time subsidy
can change the long-run level of adoption, and to provide empirically implementable tests of
their relative importance. We use an experimentation model similar to those in Moscarini
(2005) and Moscarini and Smith (2001).
We consider a technology for which health-e⁄ective adoption requires not only acquiring the
technology, but also repeatedly using it over its lifespan. In addition to anti-malarial bednets
(which can last for 3-4 years and are supposed to be used nightly), examples of such technologies
include water chlorination products (typically sold in bottles large enough to treat a 6-member
household￿ s drinking water daily for 1 month), iron pills (sold in bulk), or water ￿lters (that
have a lifespan of 6 months and should be used daily). We consider that, at the time households
decide whether to acquire the technology, they are uncertain about both the e⁄ectiveness of
network. Oster and Thornton (2009) ￿nd evidence of peer e⁄ects in the usage of a new female hygiene product
provided for free.
6the technology and the cost associated with using the technology. Households have two sources
of information: their own experimentation with the technology, and the experience of their
neighbors. Learning about the usage cost is relatively quick upon ownership of the technology
(one only needs to use it a few times to learn its usage cost), but learning about the health
e⁄ectiveness takes time, as households receive only noisy signals.
2.1 Set-up
2.1.1 Information
Bene￿ts The average e⁄ectiveness ￿ of a new health technology is ex￿ ante uncertain.
Individuals have a prior belief on ￿, concentrated on two points: p0 = Pr(￿ = 1) = 1 ￿ Pr(￿ =
0) 2 (0;1); where ￿ = 1 if the technology is ￿good￿(i.e., more e⁄ective than the status quo
technology by 1 util-equivalent), and ￿ = 0 if the technology is ￿bad￿(i.e., not more e⁄ective
than the status quo technology.)
If households own and use the technology, they get a signal about its quality. The signal
is subject to idiosyncratic noise that keeps ￿ hidden and creates the inference problem. We
consider that it is a normal random variable, a Brownian Motion with drift ￿ and known






update their belief in a Bayesian fashion from the prior p0 to the posterior pt ￿ Pr(￿ = 1jFX
t ):













￿ is the signal-to-noise ratio.
To update beliefs, households use both their own experience and that of J neighbors. We
consider that each household i has a location on a two-dimensional map, and that J signals
are drawn from the set of households within a distance d in each direction. If a fraction wit
of households in this radius experimented (i.e., bought and used) the technology in period t,
household i receives witJ signals. We consider that ￿ decreases with the number of signals
received: the more neighbors experiment, the higher the signal to noise ratio.
7Costs There are two types of costs associated with the technology: the monetary cost of
acquiring the product (price m); and the time and/or utility cost of using it, denoted by c, with
0 < c < 1.
Households readily observe m, but c is uncertain ex-ante. Households￿prior on c is a
probability distribution denoted F(:). As soon as they acquire the technology, they learn the
true c. They can also learn c from their neighbors. We consider that each household has a
probability ￿ to learn the true c from each neighboring household that acquired the technology
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c if i acquired the technology at any time prior to t
c if i learned c from a neighbor
F i
0(:) if i never acquired the technology and didn￿ t learn from any neighbor
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If i has witJ neighbors who acquired the technology at time t; the likelihood that household
i hasn￿ t learned c from a neighbor by time t is (1 ￿ ￿)witJ:
2.1.2 Payo⁄s
Time is continuous and the interest rate is r. Conditional on owning the technology and using
it, and given the belief pt about the e⁄ectiveness, a household￿ s expected instantaneous payo⁄at
time t is ￿t = pt￿c: The household￿ s value of using the technology if it is good with probability
pt solves the Bellman equation:
V1(pt;c) = r￿(pt;c)dt + (1 ￿ rdt) ￿ E(V1(pt + dpt;c))





the following ordinary di⁄erential equation:












The ￿rst term represents the current payo⁄, and the second term corresponds to the option
value of experimenting: the speed of learning 1
2p2(1￿p)2 1
￿4 is converted into payo⁄units by the
convexity of V 00
1 (pt); because information spreads posterior beliefs and empowers more informed
8decisions later on.
Households that don￿ t experiment themselves can still learn about the e⁄ectiveness from













where ￿0 > ￿1. In other words, the signal-to-noise ratio is lower when people do not receive
their own signal and purely rely on their neighbors￿signals.
2.1.3 Optimal Experimentation (conditional on purchase)
Lemma 1 The value function of the household is an increasing and convex function of p:
V1(p;c) =
￿




1=4+2r￿2 if p ￿ p(c)
V0(p;c) = 0 if p ￿ p(c)
￿
where  (c) and the threshold p(c) 2 [0;c] uniquely solve the boundary conditions V1(p) = V0(p) =
0 (value matching) and V 0
1(p) = V 0
0(p) = 0 (smooth pasting).
The value function V1(p;c￿) is drawn in Figure 1A. Below the threshold p, households
choose not to use the technology, even conditional on owning it. For any p ￿ p(c), they use the
technology. The threshold p(c) is lower than the ￿myopic￿threshold c, since the option value
of experimentation make households willing to take a negative current payo⁄.
2.1.4 Optimal Purchase Decision
The top panel of Figure 1b plots V1(p;c) as a function of c; for a given prior pt: The function
is decreasing and convex, and shifts outwards as pt increases.
Proposition 1 Call c(p) the inverse of p(c): If the household has the prior pt on the e⁄ective-
ness and the prior distribution F(:) on the cost of usage c; the household will buy the technology





Since V1(p;c) is increasing in the prior on p; the likelihood of purchase increases with the
prior pt: For a given prior pt, whether a household buys the technology will depend on its prior
9F(:) on the usage cost. The bottom panel of Figure 1b plots three possible prior distributions.
For a given prior pt, households with prior distribution F1(:) will be willing to pay a higher
price for the technology than households with the prior distributions F2(:) or F3(:):
When the new technology is ￿rst introduced, the priors p and F(:) might depend on the
availability of comparable technologies. In a context like the one in which conducted our ￿eld
experiment, where the status quo technology is already relatively good and the new technology
is similar to the old technology (e.g., the status quo technology is an insecticide-treated net and
the new technology is a long-lasting insecticide treated net), individuals may have relatively
optimistic priors about the e⁄ectiveness of the new technology. In contrast, for technologies
that are radically new (e.g., in that they rely on unknown scienti￿c principles), individuals
might start with pessimistic beliefs (low p) and adoption might be very limited, unless the
technology is heavily subsidized for at least some individuals. A good example is that of
insecticide-treated curtains, that provide the insecticide halo necessary to repel mosquitoes but
do not provide the intuitive ￿physical barrier￿against mosquitoes that people tend to think is
the critical component of a bed net.
2.2 Static E⁄ects of Price Subsidies on Experimentation Level
The dynamic e⁄ects of price subsidies will depend on their static e⁄ects on the level of ex-
perimentation: the more households experiment with the technology, the faster the learning
about e⁄ectiveness will be. In our model, the e⁄ect of a price subsidy on the total amount of
experimentation (and hence learning) is never going to be negative, but it might not be strictly
monotonic. Here is why:
A subset SA of households that get enticed to buy the product by the subsidy will experiment
with the product once they have it: those are the households that initially overestimate the usage
cost. Indeed, for a given prior on the e⁄ectiveness p, lower prices crowd in people with higher
priors on the usage cost c: Those who get surprised by a realized usage cost c￿ lower than
expected can only increase their level of experimentation as a result.
On the other hand, a subset SB of households that get enticed to buy the product by the
subsidy will not experiment with the product once they have it: those are the households that
initially underestimate the usage cost. Indeed, for a given prior on c, lower prices crowd in
10people with lower priors on p: Those who get surprised by a realized usage cost c￿ that is
higher than expected will not experiment if their prior on the e⁄ectiveness is too low, namely
if p ￿ p(c￿):
Overall, this suggests that the share of households that experiment with the product among
those who acquire it might not be a monotonic function of the subsidy level. As a result, short-
run adoption (and hence learning) might not be strictly increasing in the subsidy level. In
particular, if SA = f?g for subsidy levels above a certain threshold, then any further increase
in the subsidy above that threshold would not lead to any increase in experimentation: the level
of experimentation would level o⁄.6
In the ￿eld experiment below, we ￿nd that adoption (acquisition + experimenation) is
strictly increasing with the subsidy level (strictly decreasing with the price level). We take it as
evidence that, in our context, the subset SA is not empty. In addition, we ￿nd that the share
of people experimenting with the technology (among those who own it) does not decrease with
the subsidy level. This implies that the subset SA is larger than the subset SB : people tended
to overestimate the usage cost of our technology at baseline, rather than underestimate it, and
therefore high subsidies increased immediate adoption and learning.
In contrast, Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro (forthcoming) ￿nd that higher subsidies increased
the fraction of people who acquired a water chlorination product but did not use it. This
suggests that, in their context, subset SB was larger than subset SA : a relatively large fraction
of people underestimated the cost of using chlorine in their water (they underestimated how
bad their water would taste if they used chlorine), and as a result, they chose not to experiment
once they learned the true usage cost.
2.3 Dynamic E⁄ects
We have shown that the magnitude of the static e⁄ect of subsidies on the level of experimenta-
tion (and thus learning) will depend on the priors￿distributions. This implies that the dynamic
e⁄ect of subsidies on adoption will also depend on the priors. But besides the learning e⁄ect,
6The prior belief about the e⁄ectiveness of the product could also be an increasing function of the observed
price (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). If people face di⁄erent prices, they might start with heterogeneous priors.
We abstract from this here, and shut down this mechanism in the experiment by informing everyone of the
unsubsidized price. Alternatively, the prior belief about the e⁄ectiveness could be an increasing function of the
subsidy size. If so, the experimentation level would strictly increase with the subsidy level.
11there are two additional dynamic e⁄ects through which short-run subsidies might a⁄ect longer-
run demand: an anchoring e⁄ect and an income e⁄ect. Below, we ￿rst describe these e⁄ects,
and then describe what our empirical tests can tell us about them.
2.3.1 Anchoring E⁄ect
Let￿ s now consider that the utility of individual i is composed of two additive terms: intrinsic
utility and gain-loss utility. Intrinsic utility is a function of absolute outcomes. Gain-loss utility
captures reference-dependence. Following K‰ oszegi and Rabin (2006), we formalize reference-
dependence as follows. Denote ^ mit household i￿ s reference price for the technology at time t,
then paying a price mt for the technology generates gain-loss utility r(^ mit ￿ mt): To allow for
loss aversion, we allow the function r to be kinked at zero. For example, r could be two-piece
linear, with a slope ￿G ￿ 0 for gains (when ^ mit ￿ mit), and a slope of ￿L ￿ ￿G for losses (when
^ mit < mit).
The decision to purchase the bednet is now slightly modi￿ed compared to proposition 2.
Proposition 2 At any period t, given reference price ^ mit, household i will buy the technology




V (p0;c)dF(c) + r(^ mit ￿ mt)
This means that, for a given set of priors p and F(c), households who face a price higher
(lower) than their reference point for the technology will be less (more) likely to purchase it
than those who face a price equal to their reference point.
We consider that the reference price ^ mit evolves as follows. We assume that prior to the
introduction of the technology, all households have a common reference point ^ p0, based on the
cost of the status quo technology. After the new technology is introduced in period k, we
suppose that household i revises its reference price to ^ mi;k+t = pik;8t ￿ 1. In other words, the
household ￿anchors￿around the ￿rst o⁄er price it receives.
122.3.2 Income (via Health) E⁄ect
If the health technology is e⁄ective, households who experiment with it are likely to get healthier
over time. This positive health e⁄ect could a⁄ect disposable income in two ways. First, healthier
households are likely to be more productive and able to generate higher income. Second,
healthier households are likely to spend less on malaria treatment expenditures. If subsidies
increase the rate of adoption of the new health technology, they might thus increase disposable
income as a result.
In addition, for many health technologies, adoption by some households generates positive
health externalities for others. For example, in the case of malaria, having more neighbors
using a protective device such as a bednet reduces one￿ s own chance of infection (since malaria
is transmitted from human to human). There might thus be an indirect e⁄ect of subsidies on
the health (and thus income) level of those not directly targeted by the subsidy.
2.3.3 Overall direct e⁄ect of one-time subsidies on long-run adoption
For household i, the impact of having faced price mit in period t on the household￿ s reservation




= learning + anchoring + income
The ￿rst e⁄ect is learning-by-doing about the technology￿ s e⁄ectiveness and its usage cost.
For both parameters, the learning e⁄ect can be zero if the price in period t is such that household
i does not acquire the product and does not experiment with the product between time t and
time t + ￿t. If the household acquires the product and experiments with it, the learning
e⁄ect will be positive or negative depending on whether the household￿ s initial priors were
overestimates or underestimates. The second e⁄ect is the anchoring e⁄ect, which is positive or
zero. The third e⁄ect is the income e⁄ect, which is negative or zero. The income e⁄ect can
result from the health e⁄ect, or from a mechanical e⁄ect of the subsidy on the intertemporal
budget constraint: those who paid more for the technology in period t have less money available
to invest in the technology again in period t + ￿t.
In the experiment below, we ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of the period t price on willingness to pay
13at t + ￿t. In other words, we ￿nd that the sum of the three e⁄ects in the equation above is
negative. We take it as evidence that the anchoring e⁄ect is at best modest, and overwhelmed
by the sum of learning and income e⁄ects. We then speci￿cally test for the presence of anchoring
and ￿nd no evidence of anchoring around zero or very low prices. We also speci￿cally test for
the presence of an income e⁄ect, and ￿nd inconclusive evidence. Overall, our results suggest
that the main e⁄ect through which short-run subsidies a⁄ect later adoption is a learning e⁄ect,
which in our context appears positive (people learned the technology was better than what they
initially thought).
2.3.4 Overall indirect e⁄ect of one-time subsidies on long-run adoption
For household i, the impact of having a given share s￿i;t of neighbors that receive a high subsidy
level in period t on the household￿ s reservation price mi at a subsequent period t + ￿t is the
sum of three e⁄ects:
@mi;t+￿t
@s￿i;t
= learning + income + free-riding
The ￿rst e⁄ect represents social learning about the technology￿ s e⁄ectiveness and its usage cost.
The larger the number of neighbors who receive a low price, the larger the number of neighbors
who acquire the product and learn the usage cost. If those neighbors are ￿badly￿surprised by
the usage cost and do not experiment with the product (they belong to subset SB), there will
be no learning about the e⁄ectiveness. But if neighbors experiment with the product, the faster
the learning about the e⁄ectiveness (the higher the signal-to-noise ratio). This social learning
e⁄ect will induce higher or lower adoption in the future depending on whether the household
prior pt was too optimistic or too pessimistic to start with.7 The other two e⁄ects come from
the positive health externality. One one hand, having more neighbors experimenting with the
product can increase one￿ s own health and thus productivity level and income realization. This
corresponds to the second e⁄ect, which is likely to be positive. On the other hand, the returns
7Having more neighbors that own the product but do not use it (i.e., more neighbors in subset SB) could
actually lead to ￿mislearning￿ , if people only know their neighbors￿ownership status and not their usage status.
In other words, if household A knows that neighboring household B owns the product but doesn￿ t know that
B is not using the product, household A might think that it receives signals on the e⁄ectiveness by observing
household B￿ s health level. This would lead household A to incorrectly revise its belief about the e⁄ectiveness
downwards.
14to using the product oneself are lower if one bene￿ts from one￿ s neighbors￿own protective
behavior. This could lead one to free ride ￿the third e⁄ect, which is likely to be negative.
In the experiment below, we ￿nd a positive social e⁄ect overall (the sum of the three e⁄ects
is positive). We take it as evidence that information e⁄ects are positive and that the health
externality is either too small, or too unobservable by individuals, to generate a free-riding
e⁄ect that can dominate the learning e⁄ect.
3 Experimental Set-Up and Design
3.1 Background on Insecticide-Treated Nets
Over the past two decades, the use of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) has been established
through multiple randomized trials as an e⁄ective and cost-e⁄ective malaria control strategy
for sub-Saharan Africa (Lengeler, 2004). But coverage rates with ITNs remain low. Until
recently, one of the key challenges to widespread coverage with ITN was the need for regular
re-treatment with insecticide every 6 months, a requirement few households complied with
(D￿ Alessandro, 2001). This problem was solved recently through a scienti￿c breakthrough:
long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs), whose insecticidal properties last at least as long as the
average life of a net (4-5 years), even when the net is used and washed regularly. The ￿rst
prototype LLIN, the Olyset R ￿ Net, was approved by WHO in 2001, but did not get mass
produced until 2006. At the time this study started in Kenya in 2007, the Olyset Net, the
LLIN used in this experiment, was not available for sale, and its e⁄ectiveness￿ relative to that
of regular ITNs available for sale￿ was unknown.
More speci￿cally, at the time of the experiment, the ￿status quo￿technology that households
in Kenya had access to was a regular ITN, subsidized by Population Services International (PSI).
Pregnant women and parents of children under-￿ve could purchase an ITN for the subsidized
price of Kenyan shillings (Ksh) 50 ($0.75) at health facilities, and the general population could
purchase ITNs for the subsidized price of Ksh 100 ($1.50) at local stores.
In our study sample, 80% of households owned at least one bednet (of any kind) at baseline,
but given the large average household size, the coverage rate at the individual level was still low,
with only 41% of household members regularly sleeping under a net. About 33% of households
15had an LLIN of the brand PermaNet R ￿ at baseline. The PermaNet LLINs were received free
from the government during a mass distribution scheme targeting parents of children under 5
and conducted in conjunction with the measles vaccination campaign of July 2006, ten months
before the onset of this study. These PermaNets di⁄er substantially from the Olyset LLIN
used in our experiment: they are circular and not rectangular, made of polyester and not
polyethylene, and have a smaller mesh. They cannot be distinguished from traditional re-
treatable ITNs with the naked eye, while Olyset nets can. Finally, Olyset nets have been
judged to be less uncomfortable to sleep under than either traditional ITNs or LLINs of the
brand PermaNet, thanks to the wider mesh that enables more air to go through (making the
area under the net less hot).
3.2 Experimental Design: Phase 1
The experiment was conducted in Busia District, Western Kenya, where malaria transmission
occurs throughout the year. The study involved 1,120 households from six rural areas. Par-
ticipating households were sampled as follows. In each area, the school register was used to
create a list of households with children.8 Listed households were then randomly assigned to a
subsidy level for an LLIN. The subsidy level varied from 100% to 40%; the corresponding ￿nal
prices faced by households ranged from 0 to 250 Ksh, or at the prevailing exchange rate of 65
Ksh to US$1 at the time, from 0 to US$3.8.9 Seventeen di⁄erent prices were o⁄ered in total,
but each area, depending on its size, was assigned only four or ￿ve of these 17 prices. Thus,
if an area was assigned the price set {Ksh 50, 100, 150, 200, 250}, all the study households in
the area were randomly assigned to one of these ￿ve prices according to a computer-generated
random number. All price sets included high, intermediate, and low subsidy levels. However,
the lowest price o⁄ered in a given area was randomly varied across areas, and drawn from the
following set: {0, 40, 50, 70}. Only two areas had a price set that included free distribution for
some households.
8Since Kenya introduced Free Primary Education in 2003, school participation is high. The net primary
enrollment rate was estimated at 80% in 2005 and is probably higher now.
9A few years prior to this study, the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank estimated
that 68% of individuals in Busia district (the area of study) live below the poverty line, estimated at $0.63 per
person per day in rural areas (the level of expenditures required to purchase a food basket that allows minimum
nutritional requirements to be met) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003).
16After the random assignment to subsidy levels had been performed in o¢ ce, trained enu-
merators visited each sampled household. A baseline survey was administered to the female
and/or male head of each consenting household.10 At the end of the interview, the respondent
was given a discount voucher for an LLIN corresponding to the randomly assigned subsidy
level. The voucher indicated (1) its expiration date, (2) where it could be redeemed, (3) the
￿nal (post-discount) price to be paid to the retailer for the net, and (4) the recommended
retail price and the amount discounted from the recommended retail price.11 Vouchers could
be redeemed at participating local retailers (1 per area). The six participating retailers were
provided with a stock of blue, extra-large, rectangular Olyset nets. At the time of the study,
extra-large Olyset nets were not available to households through any other distribution channel,
which facilitated tracking of the LLINs that were sold as part of the study.
The participating retailers received as many Olysets as vouchers issued in their community,
and no more. They were not authorized to sell the study Olysets to households outside the
study sample. For each redeemed voucher, the retailers were instructed to note the voucher
identi￿cation number and the date of redemption in a standardized receipt book designed for
the experiment. The list of redeemed vouchers and the vouchers stubs themselves were collected
from retailers every 2 weeks.12
The subset of households who had redeemed their LLIN voucher were sampled for a short-
run follow-up administered during an unannounced home visit 2 months on average after the
voucher had been redeemed. During the follow-up visit, enumerators asked to see the net that
was purchased with the voucher, so as to ascertain that it was a study-supplied Olyset LLIN.
The follow-up survey also checked whether households had been charged the assigned price for
the LLIN. Usage was assessed as follows: (1) whether the respondent declared having started
using the net, and (2) whether the net was observed hanging above the bedding at the time of
10Whether the female head, male head or both were interviewed and given the voucher was randomized across
households. It had no e⁄ect on take-up. In what follows, all regressions include controls for the randomized
gender assignment.
11The fact that the recommended retail price was indicated on the voucher could have dampened the possibility
of anchoring e⁄ects. From a policy standpoint, indicating the non-subsidized price on a voucher or product is
costless, therefore estimating the overall e⁄ect of subsidies in the presence of full information about the non-
subsidized price is the relevant policy parameter.
12Participating retailers were not allowed to keep the proceeds of the study Olyset sales. However, as an
incentive to follow the protocol, participating retailers were promised a ￿xed sum of $75 to be paid upon
completion of the study, irrespective of the number of nets sold but conditional on the study rules being strictly
respected.
17the visit.
Note that, while the main advantage of the Olyset LLIN is its long-lasting property, it can
easily be di⁄erentiated from other nets in the short run: it is sturdier than other nets because
it is made of polyethylene (and not polyester) and as mentioned earlier, it is noticeably more
comfortable (less hot) thanks to its wider mesh.
3.3 Experimental Design: Phase 2
In a subset of areas (4 out of 6), a long-run follow-up was conducted 12 months after the
distribution of the ￿rst LLIN voucher.13 All households in those areas were sampled for the
long-run follow-up (both those who had redeemed their ￿rst voucher, and those who had not).
Data on the incidence of malaria in the previous month was collected. Households were also
asked if they knew people who had redeemed their vouchers and what those people had told
them about the LLIN acquired with the voucher. In addition, for those who had redeemed the
voucher, usage of the LLIN was recorded as in the ￿rst follow-up.
At the end of the visit, households received a second LLIN voucher, redeemable at the
same retailer as the LLIN voucher received a year earlier. All households faced the same price
(Ksh150 or $2.30) for this second voucher. The set-up used with retailers was identical to that
used in Phase 1.
By comparing the take-up rate of the second, uniformly-priced voucher across Phase 1 price
groups, we can test whether being exposed to a large or full subsidy dampens or enhances
willingness to pay for the same product a year later. Note, however, that since LLIN have
a lifespan of 4 to 5 years, at the time they received the second LLIN voucher, households
who had purchased an LLIN with the ￿rst voucher in Phase 1 did not need to replace their
￿rst LLIN. The redemption rate of the second voucher thus measures, for those households,
the willingness to pay for an additional LLIN, and not a replacement LLIN. If we make the
reasonable assumption of decreasing marginal returns to LLINs, the willingness to pay observed
through the second voucher redemption will be a lower bound for the willingness to pay for a
replacement LLIN.
13Two areas (randomly selected among the four areas without free distribution) had to be left out at the time
of the long-run follow-up for budgetary reasons.
183.4 Verifying Randomization
A baseline survey was administered at households￿homes between April and October 2007,
prior to the ￿rst voucher distribution. The baseline survey assessed household demographics,
socioeconomic status, and bednet ownership and coverage. Table 1 presents summary statistics
on 15 household characteristics, and their correlation with the randomized 1st LLIN price
assignment. Speci￿cally, we regress each baseline characteristic on a quadratic in the price
faced in Phase 1 and a set of area ￿xed e⁄ects:
xhj = ￿1Phj1 + ￿2(Phj1)
2 + ￿j + "hj
where xhj represents a baseline characteristic of household h in area j and Phj1 is the price
faced by household h in Phase 1. We report the coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for ￿1
(column 3) and ￿2 (column 4). All of the coe¢ cient estimates are small in magnitude and none
can be statistically distinguished from zero, suggesting that the randomization was successful
at making the price assignment orthogonal to observable baseline characteristics.14
3.5 Verifying Compliance with Study Protocol
All households that redeemed their vouchers declared, when interviewed at follow-up, that they
had been charged the assigned price when they redeemed their voucher at the shop. This
suggests that participating retailers respected the study protocol.
The sales logs kept by participating retailers show that, in total over Phase 1 and Phase 2,
95% of the redeemed vouchers were redeemed by a member of the household that had received
the voucher. Only two of the individuals that redeemed a voucher declared having paid to
acquire the voucher. This suggests that there was almost no arbitrage between households
prior to voucher redemption.
To check for potential arbitrage after redemption (i.e., people selling the LLIN to their
neighbor after having redeemed the voucher), we conducted unannounced home visits and
asked to see the LLIN that had been purchased with the voucher (the study-provided nets
14Alternative speci￿cations (linear price e⁄ect, dummy for ￿Free 1st LLIN￿ , dummies for each price groups
in Figure 1) also show balance across price groups (results available upon request).
19were easily recognizable). These home visits were conducted after both Phase 1 and Phase
2. Overall, more than 90% of households that had redeemed a voucher could show the LLIN
during the spot check.
4 Results: Learning-by-Doing
4.1 Static E⁄ects of Subsidies on Experimentation
The static e⁄ects of subsidies on take-up and usage of the Phase 1 LLIN are presented in Figure
2. Panel A shows that the take-up of the ￿rst voucher is highly sensitive to price: take-up is
quasi-universal for free LLIN vouchers (at 97.5%), but drops to 70 to 55% when the price is
between 40 and 90 Ksh (between $0.6 and $1.4), and further drops to around 30% when the price
crosses the 100 Ksh threshold ($1.5). In contrast, Panel B, which shows usage rates (among
those who redeemed their voucher), suggests that the likelihood that people experimented with
their LLIN does not increase with the price paid.15 As a result, as shown in Panel C, the
adoption rate (take-up + experimentation) drops quite rapidly as the price increases (as the
subsidy level decreases). These results are robust to adding household-level controls (regression
analysis available upon request), and are very similar to those obtained among pregnant women
by Cohen and Dupas (2010).16
In terms of the framework presented in Section 2, these ￿ndings suggest that most households
that were enticed to buy the LLIN by the subsidy were overestimating the usage cost at baseline.
In other words, subset SA seems much larger in our context than subset SB: In this context,
higher subsidies are likely to generate important learning-by-doing e⁄ects: higher subsidies lead
to a much higher share of people experimenting with the product and thereby obtaining a signal
about its e⁄ectiveness.
15We group households into ￿ve price (subsidy) groups to avoid running into small sample problems when
estimating usage rates (especially at higher prices).
16Appendix Table A1 shows that attrition at follow-up was not correlated with price, and therefore the
estimates of the e⁄ect of price on adoption are unbiased. Appendix Figure A1 shows that, not suprisingly, the
time needed to redeem the voucher increased with price.
204.2 Dynamic E⁄ects of Subsidies on Long-Run Adoption
4.2.1 Overall E⁄ect
This section tests whether households who bene￿tted from a free or highly subsidized LLIN in
Phase 1 were more or less willing to pay for a LLIN in Phase 2, when the price was high for
everyone. We test this using both declared preferences and revealed preferences.
First, we look at how households￿declared willingness to pay for a bednet was a⁄ected by
the subsidy. This is presented in Figure 3, which is restricted to the sample of households that
self-selected into buying the LLIN in Phase 1. Figure 3 presents two averages for each Phase 1
price group: the average willingness to pay for a bednet declared at baseline, before households
had received the ￿rst voucher; and the average willingness to pay declared at the follow-up,
when households were asked: ￿If you didn￿ t have this net, up to how much would you be willing
to pay to get a net like this, now that you are familiar with it?￿ . These two averages can be
considered as the ￿before￿and ￿after￿willingness to pay for those that redeemed their ￿rst
voucher.17 Figure 3 shows that the willingness to pay increased substantially and signi￿cantly
for all households, and especially for those households who received large subsidies. While part
of this increase could be imputed to a general increase in awareness of malaria issues in Kenya
over time, or to an increase in households￿wealth level over time, the e⁄ect is too large to
be explained by a simple time trend, suggesting that the large subsidies might have enabled
households to learn the bene￿ts associated with the net.18
Declared preferences might su⁄er from social desirability bias, however. Furthermore, they
are only available for the self-selected (hence biased) sample of those who acquired the ￿rst
LLIN. For these reasons, we now turn to studying revealed preferences, namely, the take-up of
the second LLIN. We have that information for all households, whether or not they puchrased
the ￿rst LLIN.
The price of the second voucher was uniform across all households (at 150 Ksh). Figure 4
presents the average purchase rate for the second LLIN o⁄ered, for each Phase 1 price group.
17Ex-ante willingness to pay increases with the o⁄ered price since only households that acquired the ￿rst
LLIN are included.
18The average time gap between these two measures of willingness to pay was 87 days. The average gap
between the time the household redeemed the voucher and the time the household was asked about willingness
to pay to replace the net was 63 days.
21The con￿dence intervals are large, but the average take-up was higher among the higher subsidy
groups (free and 40-50 Ksh price groups). The regression analysis presented in Table 2 con￿rms
this result. Columns 1 through 6 estimate the following reduced form equations:
Yhj2 = ￿1Phj1 + ￿2(Phj1)
2 + X
0
h￿ + ￿j + "hj
Yhj2 = ￿3 ￿ 1(Phj1 = 0) + X
0
h￿ + ￿j + "hj
Yhj2 = ￿4 ￿ 1(Phj1 ￿ 50) + X
0
h￿ + ￿j + "hj
where Yhj2 is a dummy equal to 1 if household h in village j bought a LLIN in Phase 2;
Phj1 is the price faced in Phase 1, Xh is a vector of household characteristics, and 1(Phj1 ￿ 50)
is a dummy equal to 1 if the price faced by household h in Phase 1 was a high-subsidy price
(below 50Ksh); the other variables are de￿ned as above.
The take-up in the ￿ 1st LLIN Free￿group is 6.1 percentage points (41%) higher than in the
non-free groups, suggesting a learning-by-doing e⁄ect (Table 2, column 5). While this e⁄ect
is not statistically distinguishable from zero (the 95% con￿dence interval is [￿:03; +:15]), it is
worth noting that the take-up of the second LLIN voucher in this group re￿ ects the demand
for a second LLIN, whereas for most households that received a high price for the ￿rst voucher,
the take-up of the second voucher re￿ ects the demand for a ￿rst LLIN (since take-up of the ￿rst
voucher was low at high prices). Under the reasonable assumption that the marginal utility of
LLINs is decreasing in the number of LLINs owned, holding everything constant, the demand
for a second LLIN should be lower than the demand for a ￿rst LLIN. In other words, the fact
that the take-up for the second voucher is not signi￿cantly lower in the ￿ 1st LLIN free￿group
than in the low-subsidy groups is enough to conclude that the willingness to pay in the ￿ 1st
LLIN free￿group increased.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 present a speci￿cation with a ￿high subsidy￿dummy (1st LLIN
price ￿ 50 Ksh). As was apparent in Figure 4, the high-subsidy group in Phase 1 had a higher
redemption rate in Phase 2 than the other groups. The e⁄ect of having received a high subsidy
in Phase 1 is signi￿cant at the 10 percent level, both without and with household level controls.
Columns 10-12 of Table 2 estimate the following equation:
Yhj2 = ￿5 d Uhj1 + X
0
h￿ + ￿j + "hj
22where d Uhj1 indicates whether household h experimented with an LLIN in Phase 1 (i.e., not
only bought the LLIN in Phase 1 but also used it), instrumented with either the price faced
in Phase 1 and its square (column 10); a dummy indicating whether the price faced in Phase
1 was zero (full subsidy, column 11); or a dummy indicating whether the price faced in Phase
1 was 50Ksh or lower (high subsidy, column 12). The three possible ￿rst-stage estimations are
presented in columns 7-9 of Table 2.
The estimates of ￿5 in these instrumental variable speci￿cations measure the e⁄ect ￿on the
treated￿ , that is the e⁄ect of having experimented with the ￿rst LLIN. The e⁄ect is close to a
90% increase in take-up of the second LLIN (+13 percentage points o⁄ of a 15 percent mean
in the non-free group) and the signi￿cance approaches 10% (the p-value of the coe¢ cient on
￿experimented￿is 0.14 in column 11 and below 0.1 in column 12). Note, however, that the
exclusion restriction for the instrument (the price of the ￿rst voucher a⁄ects willingness to pay
for the second LLIN only through the learning e⁄ect) does not hold in the presence of anchor-
ing e⁄ects. Thus our preferred speci￿cations are the reduced form speci￿cations presented in
columns 1-6.
Overall, these results suggest that potential negative anchoring or entitlement e⁄ects of
subsidies are at best limited in scope, and in any case overwhelmed by a positive e⁄ect.
4.2.2 Directly Testing for Anchoring
In Figure 5, we directly test for the presence of anchoring by looking at the gap between
households￿declared willingness to pay for an LLIN at follow-up, and the price paid in Phase
1. We show the distribution of this gap separately for each price group. The ￿rst row shows
the distribution of the gap ￿before￿(before households received the ￿rst voucher and observed
the Phase 1 price) and the second row shows the distribution of the gap ￿after￿(at follow-up).
A gap of zero means that people declared, at follow-up, being willing to pay exactly the price
they were randomly assigned in Phase 1. As in Figure 3, we have this data only for the self-
selected sample of households who purchased the LLIN in Phase 1. The evidence in Figure
5 suggests that households who paid a positive price anchored somewhat around the o⁄ered
price: at follow-up, the distribution of the gap narrows around zero for those in positive price
groups. This is not the case for households that received a free LLIN in Phase 1, however. For
23those, the density at zero is lower at the follow-up than at baseline, suggesting no anchoring at
all (utmost left panel, Figure 5).
Note that, as the subsidy was provided by a local research organization, households in the
study might have been less likely to exhibit ￿anchoring￿e⁄ects than they would have if the
subsidy had been implemented nation-wide by the government. On the other hand, since the
implementing agency was local, households might have thought they could induce it to provide
high subsidies for everyone by boycotting higher prices. It is di¢ cult to gauge the direction of
the bias, and it is possible that in other contexts subsidies could lead to anchoring.
4.2.3 Income (via Health) E⁄ect?
Section 4.2.1 has shown that households who received a free or highly subsidized LLIN in Phase
1 were not less likely to buy an LLIN a year later. Rather, they appeared somewhat more likely
to invest in an LLIN in Phase 2, despite the fact that most of them already owned one. As shown
in Section 2, two possible mechanisms may have generated this positive e⁄ect on willingness
to pay for an LLIN: (1) an experience e⁄ect (the subsidy enables households to learn about
the net bene￿ts of the technology); and (2) an income e⁄ect via a health e⁄ect. We ￿nd some
suggestive evidence, presented in Appendix Table A2, that the incidence of malaria among
household heads (either the male or the female) was lower among households who received a
high LLIN subsidy in Phase 1. This e⁄ect is not surprising given the large medical literature
showing large private returns to bednet use (Lengeler, 2004). Given the existing evidence of
a link from health to productivity at the micro level (Strauss and Thomas, 1998), this health
e⁄ect among household heads could potentially have generated an income e⁄ect. In this section,
we try to estimate how big a role the income e⁄ect had in the increased willingness to pay for
LLINs among high-subsidy recipients.
We do not have data on income itself (precise income data is typically di¢ cult to measure
among the self-employed, who make the great majority of our sample). Instead, in order
to test for the presence of an income e⁄ect, we distributed uniformly-priced vouchers for a
chlorine-based water-treatment product called WaterGuard R ￿ to all study households in the
two communities where the LLIN subsidy in Phase 1 reached 100% for some households. The
WaterGuard vouchers were distributed about 5 months after the ￿rst LLIN vouchers had been
24distributed. They enabled households to buy a bottle of WaterGuard at a price of Ksh 15
($0.10), equivalent to 75% of the current retail price for WaterGuard. WaterGuard vouchers
could be redeemed at the same participating local retailers as the LLIN vouchers.19
If the experience e⁄ect is the main channel behind the positive e⁄ect on willingness to pay
for the second LLIN observed in Table 2, the take-up of the WaterGuard voucher should be
completely independent of the (random) price households faced for their ￿rst LLIN voucher.
Alternatively, if bene￿ciaries of free LLINs have higher disposable income because of the subsidy
and the positive health impact of the ￿rst LLIN, the take-up of the WaterGuard product should
also increase, provided clean water is a normal good.
Table 3 presents evidence on how the subsidy level for the LLIN a⁄ected take-up of the
WaterGuard voucher in the two areas selected for this exercise. The results suggest that the
recipients of free LLINs were 6 percentage points more likely to redeem their WaterGuard
voucher than those who did not receive a full LLIN subsidy. This e⁄ect is not signi￿cant, and
in relative terms, the magnitude of the e⁄ect is smaller than that observed for the second LLIN
take-up in Table 2. The take-up of the WaterGuard voucher was 40% on average, and therefore
a 6 percentage points increase corresponds to just a 15% increase, in contrast with the 41%
increase in take-up observed for the second LLIN among recipients of a free LLIN in Phase 1.
The e⁄ect on the treated (those who actively used the free LLIN) is greater in magnitude (+15
percentage points, or 37%), but still lower than that observed for the second LLIN (90%).
Overall, these results suggest that income e⁄ects played at best a limited role in the positive
impact of LLIN subsidies on willingness to pay for LLINs observed in section 3.3.
5 Results: Social Learning
Given the large di⁄erences in LLIN take-up across price groups, the random assignment of
households to price groups in Phase 1 generates an exogenous source of geographic variation in
the density of households that had a chance to experiment with an LLIN. As shown in Figure
2, households randomly assigned to a low price (high subsidy) were much more likely to buy
19Since WaterGuard was available for sale at local markets at the time of the experiment, it was necessary to
o⁄er a small discount in order to measure take-up accurately. In the absence of a discount, households would
have had no incentive to bring their voucher when buying the product, and we would not have been able to
trace demand.
25an LLIN in Phase 1 than households assigned a high price. The time needed for households to
acquire the LLIN was also much lower when the subsidy was higher. Appendix Figure 1 shows
that households that received a voucher for a free LLIN typically redeemed it within a few days.
In contrast, those who were assigned a high price were very unlikely to redeem their voucher,
and if they did, they took two months to redeem it. All in all, across neighborhoods within
a given village, the ￿exposure￿to LLINs varied with the share of households that received a
high subsidy level. Since this share was exogenously determined by the random assignment, we
can exploit this variation to estimate social e⁄ects without running into the re￿ ection problem
identi￿ed by Manski (1993).
Using GIS coordinates, we compute, for each household in the sample, the number of sam-
pled households that live within a given radius, and the number and share of them who received
a voucher for a given subsidy level. In particular, for households who faced a positive price,
we compute the share of households within a given radius who received the maximum subsidy
o⁄ered in the area (i.e., the share of households who received a voucher for a free LLIN in the
two areas where the subsidy reached 100%; the share of households who received a voucher for
an LLIN at 40 Ksh in the area where the lowest price was 40Ksh; etc.). We use three di⁄erent
radii to de￿ne social networks or neighborhoods: 250 meters, 500 meters, and 750 meters. Ap-
pendix Table A3 presents summary statistics on these density measures in Panel A. On average,
households who received a positive-price voucher have 1.4 neighbors within a 250m radius (4.4
neighbors within 500m, 8.53 within 750m) who received the maximum possible subsidy level
o⁄ered in the area. This represents, at the mean, 22-23% of the study households living within
these radii.20
Figure 6 plots the coe¢ cients of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is whether
or not a given household purchased the LLIN in Phase 1 and the independent variable is the
share (panel A) or the number (panel B) of study households within a 500m radius of the given
20Panel B of Table A3 tests whether these density measures are correlated with the voucher price. Column
1 regresses the price households faced on the share of households with the maximum subsidy within a 250m
radius, controlling for the total number of sampled households within that radius. The coe¢ cient on the share
is statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level, but small in magnitude (a household with 100% of sampled neighbors
in the ￿ maximum subsidy￿group faces a price US$ 0.23 (13 Ksh) higher than a household with 0% of sampled
neighbors in the maximum subsidy group). If anything, this positive correlation between own price and exposure
to neighbors with cheap prices will lead to a downwards bias in the estimates of social learning/spillovers. None
of the other exposure measures have statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in the price regressions (Table A3, Panel
B, columns 3-6).
26household who received the maximum subsidy o⁄ered in the area in Phase 1. Both speci￿cations
show take-up of the Phase 1 LLIN increasing as exposure to the product via neighbors increases.
To con￿rm these results and test how sensitive these results are to the choice of the radius,
Table 4 reports results from estimating regressions similar to those presented in Table 2 (columns
1 to 4), but including various measures of social exposure to LLIN, and restricting the sample
to households that did not receive a free LLIN (i.e, households that received a positively priced
voucher).21 For each radius, we run the following speci￿cation:
Yhj1 = ￿ShareMaxj1 + ￿1Phj1 + ￿2Phj1
2 + X
0
h￿ + ￿j + TotalHHj + "hj
The regressor of interest is ShareMaxj1, the share of neighbors (within a given radius)
who received the maximum subsidy o⁄ered in area j in Phase 1. The total number of study
households within 500 meters (TotalHHj) is included as a control variable to account for the
fact that people living in more densely populated areas may be more likely to adopt new
products. Since the density measures may be spatially correlated, we present standard errors
corrected for spatial dependence in brackets, in addition to presenting the White standard
errors in parentheses. We use the spacial dependence correction proposed by Conley (1999).
The results in Table 4 are quantitatively unchanged across all three radius choices and
across the two standard error formulas. The results suggest that the higher the proportion of
neighbors who received the high subsidy, the more likely the household is to have redeemed the
voucher and purchased the LLIN. When looking at the results using the ￿ within 500m radius￿
de￿nition of social networks, we ￿nd that, if all of a household￿ s neighbors sampled for the
study received the maximum subsidy, the probability of redeeming the voucher increases by 22
percentage points. This implies that households are over 50% more likely to invest in the LLIN
if all of their sampled neighbors received the maximum subsidy. This is a non-trivial e⁄ect
since the average price households had to pay for the LLIN was 120 Ksh ($1.85), a relatively
large sum for rural households in the areas of study.
In Columns 3-4, 7-8 and 11-12 of Table 4, the independent variable is the share of sampled
households within a given radius who are using the LLIN. To overcome the obvious endogeneity
21Since 97.5% of households who received a free voucher redeemed it, and did so within a few days, adding
households who received a free voucher in this analysis doesn￿ t add information.
27issue, we instrument the share using an LLIN with the share of sampled households within that
radius who received the maximum subsidy level. In other words, we run:
Yhj1 = ￿ \ ShareUj + X
0
h￿ + ￿j + TotalHH;j + "hj
where ShareUj, the share of households within a given radius who are using an LLIN, is
instrumented by ShareMaxj1: The estimates of ￿ are positive and signi￿cant in all speci￿ca-
tions, which con￿rms that households learn through their neighbors￿experimentation with the
product.
In Appendix Table A4, we report results from two alternate speci￿cations. First, we include
the full distribution of prices around household i, rather than just the share with the maximum
subsidy level. The results are unchanged in substance. Second, we look at levels, rather than
densities: the regressor of interest is the total number of households within the radius who
have received the high subsidy, instead of the share. The results are somewhat weaker, but the
overall pattern is consistent with social learning.
Finally, we look at how take-up of the second LLIN (redemption of the Phase 2 voucher)
was a⁄ected by exposure via neighbors in Phase 1. The results are presented graphically in
Figure 6 (dashed line) and suggests that redemption in Phase 2 was not a⁄ected by exposure
via neighbors, except at very high levels of exposure, where exposure seems to have a negative
e⁄ect (though an insigni￿cant one). This is likely due to a simple budget constraint e⁄ect:
households who were encouraged to buy an LLIN in Phase 1 by their neighbors had less cash
on hand to acquire a second LLIN in Phase 2. Overall, these results suggest that exposure
through neighbors increased the likelihood that households bought at least one LLIN, but had
no impact on the likelihood that households bought both LLINs.
Social learning or mimicry? The social di⁄usion e⁄ects we observe occured within three
months (the timeframe households had to redeem their ￿rst voucher). Do these e⁄ects cor-
respond to social learning or to pure mimicry? In other words, what could households have
learned from their neighbors within that timeframe? Did they learn about the attributes of the
product or did they feel that owning the product was important for social status?
Given the product studied, a pure mimicry e⁄ect is unlikely. Bednet ownership and usage is
28not publicly observable. Even if neighbors visit each other￿ s house, they do not see the sleeping
area, which is typically separated from the ￿living room￿by a wall or a curtain, or in a separate
structure. For this reason, a household can easily pretend to own an LLIN, a claim that the
neighbors cannot easily verify. In this context, it is unlikely that LLIN ownership could have
been taken as or become a strong indicator of social status.
A more reasonnable explanation for the di⁄usion e⁄ects we observe is that households learned
about the product￿ s qualities by talking with their neighbors. But did they learn about the
health or the non-health attributes, or both? That is, did they learn about the high health
e⁄ectiveness or the low usage cost or both? We cannot perfectly answer this question. While
households that acquired an LLIN reported fewer malaria episodes during the 1-year follow-
up survey (see Appendix Table A2), we do not have any data to check whether the early
redeemers had had time to observe a decrease in malaria incidence within the ￿rst three months,
and whether they shared that information with their neighbors before the neighbors￿vouchers
expired. However, qualitative data collected during the 1-year follow-up survey suggests that
discussions among neighbors about the LLIN involved both its health and non-health attributes.
About 25% of households who reported hearing about the Olyset LLIN from their neighbors said
the neighbors mentioned the LLIN was e⁄ective against mosquitoes / malaria; 46% reported
hearing about how comfortable and strong the LLIN was; and 29% reported their neighbors
said the net was ￿good￿or ￿better than other nets￿but did not give more details as to what
aspects their neighbors said. Overall, while we cannot rule mimicry as a possible explanation
for the social e⁄ects we observe, social learning appears the most likely factor.
6 Conclusion
It is often argued that subsidies for high-return technologies (such as bednets, treadle pumps,
or fertilizer) in the short-run might be detrimental for their adoption in the long run. There
are two main arguments: (1) subsidies may not foster learning about the technology if subsidy
recipients do not use the technology (in fact, it might even hinder learning if subsidy recipients
misuse the technology); and (2) previously encountered prices may act as ￿anchors￿that a⁄ect
people￿ s valuation of a product independently of its intrinsic qualities.
This paper used a randomized ￿eld experiment to estimate the e⁄ect of a one-time, targeted
29subsidy on the long-run adoption of a new health product with high private returns (the long-
lasting antimalarial bednet). We ￿nd that temporary subsidies for a subset of households
increase the average willingness to pay for bednets in the general population, through both
learning-by-doing and social learning e⁄ects. We contrast our ￿ndings with those of two previous
randomized studies that found opposite results for two other health technologies. We argue
that all three sets of results are consistent with a simple model of technology adoption in which
households are initially uncertain about both the health e⁄ectivness of a new technology and
its non-monetary usage cost. In such a model, the e⁄ect of subsidies on learning and adoption
depends on whether households initially overestimate or underestimate the usage cost, and how
high the private returns to adoption are.
In our experiment, the technology we introduced was relatively comparable to the status
quo technology, therefore households in the sample are likely to have used their beliefs about
the usage cost and e⁄ectiveness of the status quo technology as priors for the new technol-
ogy. Because the new technology had both lower usage costs and higher private returns than
the status quo, high subsidies helped recipients learn that the true usage cost was lower than
expected, thereby increasing immediate adoption and enabling faster learning about the e⁄ec-
tiveness of the new technology. In contrast, for a technology or product that would have had
no comparable status quo technology, as that studied by Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro (forthcom-
ing), individuals might have vastly underestimated both the usage cost and e⁄ectiveness. In
such a context, subsidies can have only a limited impact on immediate adoption, and thus on
learning and long-run adoption. For a technology that has only low private returns but high
social returns, as is the case in the Kremer and Miguel (2007) experiment, short-run subsidies
enable households to learn they should not privately invest in the product. In such a context,
subsidies will dampen long-run adoption.
The extent to which the adoption of new products di⁄uses through neighbors or friends is a
central question, especially for less developed economies where modern di⁄usion channels, such
as TV commercials, do not reach the great majority of the population. The evidence provided
in this paper suggests that, at least for some class of preventative health products, learning by
doing and social learning are important channels through which short-term, targeted subsidies
can translate into sustained levels of adoption. This provides a rationale for subsidies even for
technologies that do not generate positive externalities.
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34Figure 2
Panel A: Share of study households that purchased the LLIN in Phase 1
Panel B: Among households that bought LLIN in Phase 1, share using the net at follow-up
Notes: Data from 1,120 households (Panels A and C), 479 households (Panel B, solid line), 273 households (Panel B, dashed line).
The second follow-up was conducted in only 4 of the 6 study areas. Usage is self-reported (see Table 2, cols. 7-9, for results on
observed usage.)  The exchange rate at the time of the study was around 65 Ksh to US$ 1 .
The number of sampled households in each price group is as follows. FREE: 117 obs; 40-50 Ksh: 173 obs; 60-90 Ksh: 196 obs; 100-
120 Ksh: 215 obs; 130-150 Ksh: 199 obs; 190-250 Ksh: 220 obs. 
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35Figure 3
Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Declared Willingness To Pay (in Ksh) for LLIN, by Phase 1 price groups
(subsample of households who redeemed 1st LLIN voucher)
Notes: Figures 2 and 4 include data from 429 households. Figure 3 includes data from 599 households. Note that the two samples are not
comparable across figures: Figures 2 and 4 include only those who redeemed their 1st voucher, across all 6 study areas. Figure 3 includes all
households (whether or not they redeemed their 1st LLIN voucher) but in only 4 study areas. Ex-ante willingness to pay increases with the
price group in Figure 2 since only households that acquired the first LLIN are included. 
Redemption of 2nd LLIN Voucher (uniformly priced at 150Ksh), by 1st LLIN voucher price group
Figure 4
Figure 5
Anchoring around Phase 1 Price ? Gap between Declared WTP and Price Paid
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36Figure 6
LLIN Purchases Among Households facing a Positive Price in Phase 1, by Level of Exposure
Notes: Sample restricted to the 985 households that received a positively priced LLIN voucher in Phase 1, and for whom GIS coordinates could
be collected. Each graph plots the coefficients and confidence intervals obtained through OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if the household purchased at least one LLIN (solid line) or two LLINs (dashed line). The independent variable is the share (panel A)
or the number (panel B) of study households within a 500m radius of the given household who received the maximum subsidy offered in the
area. In both panels, the regression controls for the total number of households that live within a 500m radius.
Panel A: By Density of Exposure













0-10% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-59% >59%
Share of Households within 500m radius with Max Subsidy in Phase 1
Purchased LLIN in Phase 1 95% CI











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-9 >9
Number of Households within 500m radius with Max Subsidy in Phase 1
Purchased LLIN in Phase 1 95% CI
Purchased LLIN in Phase 2 95% CI
 

















Household size 7.11 2.749 -0.150 0.030 0.843
(.282) (.071)
Age of Household Head 45.715 13.155 -1.232 0.032 0.032
(1.326) (.331)
5.447 2.852 -0.129 0.016 0.745
(.291) (.073)
Socio-Economic Status
Female head has completed primary school 0.248 0.432 0.030 -0.006 0.776
(.044) (.011)
1.762 1.036 0.063 -0.034 0.063
(.107) (.027)
Household assets index value (in US $) 338.227 324.965 25.991 -5.142 0.682
(33.069) (8.265)
Electricity at home 0.019 0.136 0.010 -0.003 0.671
(.014) (.004)
At least one member of HH has a bank account 0.12 0.325 0.000 0.003 0.603
(.033) (.008)
Bednet Ownership at Baseline
Number of bednets owned 1.738 1.51 -0.130 0.038 0.575
(.154) (.038)
0.408 0.368 -0.023 0.009 0.469
(.038) (.009)
HH owns a circular PermaNet LLIN* 0.327 0.47 -0.036 0.016 0.733
(.068) (.023)
HH ever received a free bednet 0.323 0.468 -0.026 0.003 0.681
(.048) (.012)
0.623 0.485 0.052 -0.014 0.437
(.045) (.011)
Declared willingness to pay for a bed net (in US$) 1.561 1.533 0.172 -0.027 0.300
(.158) (.039)
1.832 1.659 0.051 -0.013 0.952
(.164) (.041)
Number of households 1120
Distance from shop where voucher has to be redeemed (in 
km)
Notes: Columns 3 and 4 show coefficient estimates and their standard errors for two independent variables (the 1st LLIN price, column 3, and its 
square, column 4) estimated through linear regressions with area fixed-effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
* The LLINs subsidized during the experiment were family-size rectangular Olysets. 
Table 1. Baseline Characteristics of Participating Households
Number of household members with an income-generating 
activity
Number of children (under 18) currently living in 
household
Share of HH members that slept under a net the previous 
night
Has ever shopped at shop where voucher has to be 
redeemed
38(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1
st LLIN Price in US$ -0.029 -0.043 -0.362
(0.042) (0.042) (0.049)***
(1
st LLIN Price in US$) squared 0.003 0.006 0.051
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)***
1
st LLIN Price = 0 (Free) 0.048 0.061 0.432
(0.046) (0.046) (0.055)***
1
st LLIN Price ≤ 50 Ksh (High Subsidy) 0.065 0.076 0.361
(0.039)* (0.039)* (0.047)***
Experimented with 1st LLIN (instrumented with polynomial in price) 0.123
(0.085)
Experimented with 1st LLIN (instrumented with "free" dummy) 0.141
(0.107)
Experimented with 1st LLIN (instrumented with "High Subsidy" dummy) 0.212
(0.111)*
Household level controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 599 599 599 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590
Mean of Dep. Variable in non-free group 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.15
Mean of Dep. Variable in non-"High Subsidy" group 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.14
F-Stat First Stage 51.5 61.3 59.0
Table 3. Effect of 1
st LLIN voucher price on take-up of other product
(2) (4) (5)
1
st LLIN Price = 0 (Free) 0.066 0.423
(0.066) (0.060)***
Experimented with 1st LLIN (instrumented with "1
st LLIN Price = 0") 0.154
(0.152)
Household level controls included Yes Yes
Observations 264 275 265
Mean of Dep. Variable in non-free group 0.40 0.38 0.40
F-Stat First Stage 49.623












Notes: Sample restricted to the 2 areas where WaterGuard vouchers were distributed. "Experimented with 1st LLIN" is a dummy equal to 1 if the household redeemed the 1st LLIN voucher and the net 










Notes: "Experimented with 1
st LLIN" is a dummy equal to 1 if the household redeemed the 1
st LLIN voucher and the net was seen hanging during at least one of the two surprise follow-up visits.
Coefficient estimates obtained using linear regression with area fixed effects. Price of 1st LLIN varies from 0 to US$3.8. Household level controls in columns 3-11 include all 15 variables presented in
Table 1.  Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Bought 2
nd LLIN 
Table 2. Effect of 1
st LLIN price on take-up of 2








39(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Within 250m radius of household…





Within 500m radius of household…





Within 750m radius of household…





Total # of study households within 500m radius (/10) 0.020 0.027 0.015 0.023 0.019 0.027 0.016 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.017 0.028
(0.011)* (0.012)** (0.012) (0.013)* (0.011)* (0.012)** (0.012) (0.012)** (0.011)* (0.012)** (0.012) (0.012)**
[0.011]* [0.012]** [0.011]* [0.012]** [0.012] [0.0125]*
2
rd Degree Polynomial in LLIN Price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 985 978 985 978 985 978 985 978 985 978 985 978
Mean of Dep. Variable 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394
Household Bought 1
st LLIN
Table 4. Diffusion Effects through networks
Notes: Sample restricted to households that received a positively priced voucher at baseline (1st voucher). Coefficient estimates obtained using linear regressions with area fixed effects. All regressions also 
include a quadratic in own price.  Household level controls include all 15 variables presented in Table 1. 
White standard errors presented in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for spatial dependence are presented in brackets. *Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Share of study households using LLIN (instrumented 
with Share with max subsidy)
Share of study households using LLIN (instrumented 
with Share with max subsidy)
Share of study households using LLIN (instrumented 
with Share with max subsidy)
40Figure A1
Number of Days needed to Redeem 1st LLIN Voucher, by 1st LLIN voucher price group
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41(1) (2) (3) (4)
1
st LLIN Price in US$ -0.017 0.035
(0.043) (0.028)
(1
st LLIN Price in US$) squared 0.007 -0.010
(0.013) (0.007)
1
st LLIN Price = 0 (Free) -0.012 -0.012
(0.039) (0.030)
Household level controls included
Observations 492 492 642 642
Mean of Dep. Variable in non-free group 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07
Estimated effect of a price increase:  
from $0 to $1 -0.010 0.025
p-value 0.750 0.239
from $1 to $2 0.005 0.006
p-value 0.780 0.621
Bought 1
st LLIN but 







Notes: Coefficient estimates obtained using linear regression with area fixed effects. Price varies from 0 to
US$3.8. Baseline characteristics are missing for a few households. The sample in columns 1 and 2 is restricted
to those who redeemed their 1st voucher. The sample in columns 3 and 4 is restricted to households in the 4
study areas where the 2nd voucher was distributed.
*Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
42(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
1
st LLIN Price = 0 (Free) -0.029 -0.035
(0.026) (0.027)
1
st LLIN Price ≤ 50 Ksh (High Subsidy) -0.020 -0.030
(0.023) (0.022)
Experimented with 1st LLIN (instrumented with "free" dummy) -0.065 -0.088
(0.077) (0.068)
Experimented with 1st LLIN (instrumented with "High Subsidy" dummy) -0.076 -0.095
(0.068) (0.070)
Household level controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 961 961 946 946 961 961 946 946
Mean of Dep. Variable in non-free group 0.093
Mean of Dep. Variable in non-"High Subsidy" group 0.100
Table A2. Health Effect
Had malaria in the month preceding the 1-yr Follow-up Survey
Notes:  Sample restricted to the four areas where the first year follow-up was conducted for both redeemers and non-redeemers of the 1st LLIN 
voucher. Coefficient estimates obtained using linear regression with area fixed effects and gender fixed effects. Sample includes up to two observations 
per household (male and female head). Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Price varies from 0 to US$3.8.  Household level controls 
in columns 3,4,7 and 8 include all 15 variables presented in Table 1. 
*Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
43Mean Std. Dev Min Max Median
Within 250m radius 
Share with max subsidy 0.22 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.20
Share using LLIN 0.23 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.19
# with max subsidy 1.39 1.50 0 8 1
# using LLIN 1.51 1.85 0 10 1
Total # of sampled households 5.96 5.24 0 31 5
Within 500m radius 
Share with max subsidy 0.23 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.22
Share using LLIN 0.25 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.24
# with max subsidy 4.40 3.53 0 17 4
# using LLIN 5.05 4.54 0 21 4
Total # of sampled households 18.92 13.28 0 63 18
Within 750m radius 
Share with max subsidy 0.23 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.23
Share using LLIN 0.26 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.26
# with max subsidy 8.53 5.76 0.00 25 8
# using LLIN 9.62 7.25 0.00 32 8
Total # of sampled households 35.55 20.65 0.00 82 38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within 250m radius 
Share with max subsidy 0.234
(0.134)*
# with max subsidy 0.023
(0.031)
Total # of sampled households 0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.009)
Within 500m radius 
Share with max subsidy 0.164
(0.204)
# with max subsidy 0.001
(0.017)
Total # of sampled households 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
Within 750m radius 
Share with max subsidy 0.275
(0.257)
# with max subsidy 0.006
(0.012)
Total # of sampled households 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003)
Observations 987 987 987 987 987 987
Panel B. Exogeneity of Price to Social Network Variables
Table A3. Exposure Variables
Panel A. Summary Statistics
1st LLIN Price in US$
Notes: Coefficient estimates obtained using linear regression with area fixed effects. Sample restricted to households that received a positively 
priced voucher.
*Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
44(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Within 250m radius
Share of study households with max subsidy 0.138
(0.073)*
Share of study households with price 60-90 0.096
(0.084)
Share of study households with price 100-120 0.102
(0.077)
Share of study households with price 130-150 0.025
(0.083)
# of study households with max subsidy 0.000 0.003
(0.013) (0.014)
# of study households with price 60-90 0.001
(0.014)
# of study households with price 100-120 -0.010
(0.012)
# of study households with price 130-150 -0.004
Within 500m radius
(0.015)
Share of study households with max subsidy 0.216
(0.114)*
Share of study households with price 60-90 0.009
(0.115)
Share of study households with price 100-120 -0.049
(0.115)
Share of study households with price 130-150 0.063
(0.136)
# of study households with max subsidy 0.010 0.010
(0.009) (0.009)
# of study households with price 60-90 -0.006
(0.009)
# of study households with price 100-120 -0.003
(0.012)
# of study households with price 130-150 0.006
Within 750m radius
(0.010)
Share of study households with max subsidy 0.249
(0.144)*
Share of study households with price 60-90 -0.051
(0.147)
Share of study households with price 100-120 -0.030
(0.143)
Share of study households with price 130-150 -0.096
(0.172)
# of study households with max subsidy 0.009 0.011
(0.005)* (0.005)**
# of study households with price 60-90 -0.006
(0.005)
# of study households with price 100-120 0.000
(0.006)
# of study households with price 130-150 0.000
(0.005)
0.022 0.028 0.036 0.027 0.008 0.020 0.027 0.002 0.013
(0.013)* (0.015)* (0.020)* (0.012)** (0.022) (0.057) (0.012)** (0.018) (0.026)
Observations 978 978 978 978 978 978 978 978 978
Mean of Dep. Variable 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394
Table A4. Diffusion Effects: Experimental Evidence with Alternative Specifications
Notes: Sample restricted to households that received a positively priced voucher at baseline (1st voucher). Coefficient estimates obtained using linear 
regressions with area fixed effects. All regressions also include a quadratic in own price and all the household level variables presented in Table 1. 
*Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Bought 1
st LLIN
Total # of study households within 500m radius 
(/10)
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